What Trump’s critical minerals proclamation means for Canadian mining
On January 14, the White House dropped another Section 232 bombshell, this time on processed critical minerals and their derivative products. It came out alongside semiconductor tariffs and was largely buried in the noise. If you have been following Texture’s analysis, you know the National Security Strategy and the Space Superiority order told us where Trump wants to project power. This proclamation tells us how he plans to re-wire the supply chains that feed that power. And again, Canada is very much in scope.
The Brief
Section 232 is the U.S. law that allows Trump to slap tariffs or quotas on imports if they are deemed to threaten national security. This is the same tool Trump used to hit Canadian steel and aluminum in 2018 and 2025.
The Commerce Department’s investigation concluded that imports of processed critical minerals and their derivative products are coming in “in such quantities and under such circumstances as to threaten to impair” U.S. national security. These products are essential to almost everything that matters to Trump’s agenda: advanced weapons systems, data centres, nuclear power, grid equipment, automotive parts, and satellites.
As of 2024, the U.S. was 100 per cent import-reliant for 12 critical minerals and at least 50 per cent import-reliant for another 29. Even where it mines ore at home, it lacks the processing capacity, so material is shipped overseas and refined elsewhere, then re-imported as magnets, powders or metals.
Trump has ordered his Commerce Secretary and U.S. Trade Representative to negotiate critical mineral deals within 180-days to “adjust” imports, so they no longer pose a national-security threat. Expect long-term supply commitments, price floors, and conditions on where material is processed (read: North America, preferably the U.S.). If talks stall or under-deliver, the proclamation leaves the door wide open for tariffs or minimum import prices on specific minerals.
On the same day, Trump signed a companion Section 232 action on semiconductors and chip-making equipment. Commerce found that the U.S. now makes roughly 10 per cent of the chips it consumes and that this dependency is a national-security risk because chips are central to defence systems, nuclear plants, grids, telecom, medical devices and critical infrastructure sectors.
The plan has two phases. First, Washington will negotiate with key jurisdictions on ways to “strengthen the U.S. semiconductor industry,” while immediately imposing a 25 per cent tariff on a narrow set of advanced AI-class chips, with carve-outs for chips used to build the U.S. tech stack like data centres and R&D. Second, depending on how those talks go, Trump is openly threatening much broader tariffs on chips and manufacturing equipment, paired with a “tariff offset” scheme that rewards companies investing in U.S. supply-chain assets.
What this means for Canada at 50,000 feet
This cuts right across Canada’s “critical minerals superpower” story. Canada sells minerals into U.S. defence, auto and energy supply chains. We are building and attracting new refineries, battery-materials plants and advancing rare earth projects as an answer to China-dominated processing. And in the last year, Washington has even taken equity stakes in two Canadian critical-minerals companies to secure supply.
But the uncomfortable truth is that we’ve spent much of the last decade talking about the potential rather than unlocking it at scale. A handful of projects are moving, but many of Canada’s biggest deposits are stuck in feasibility purgatory, leaving capital and talent to look elsewhere.
This proclamation is good news for projects that keep value-add inside North America. It is very bad news for business models that rely on shipping Canadian concentrate to be processed outside of North America before coming back into the U.S. as magnets, powders or specialty alloys. Export-and-re-import chains are now structurally exposed, while vertically integrated and allied-nation processing plays stand to benefit.
Risks and opportunities
Two big risks jump out.
First, tariffs are lurking. There are no duties today, but Section 232 is the authority that makes them easy to switch on. If negotiations over the next six months don’t deliver what Washington wants, expect price floors or tariffs on selected products. Even if Canada ultimately gets carve-outs, markets may price the risk.
Second, there are rules-of-origin and supply-chain security risks. Supply chains where Canadian ore goes offshore for value-add and then into the U.S. will be scrutinized. Consider, for example, China’s domination of rare earth elements processing, upwards of 85 per cent worldwide. You can expect Washington to start asking: where was this separated and whose reagents were used? If any link is in a country they now treat as a strategic vulnerability, expect pressure to unwind it.
The flip side is that this proclamation reads like a shopping list for exactly what Canada says it wants to build. It also leans heavily on “secure and reliable supply chains” from trusted partners. That is an opening for Canadian nickel, copper, uranium and rare earth projects positioned as North American hubs for refining and separation. Taken together with the Joint Action Plan on Critical Minerals that Canada and the U.S. signed in 2020 (under Trump), this proclamation should mean more joint U.S.–Canadian investments, stockpiles and offtake agreements that explicitly keep processing in allied hands. It should also incentivize investments in critical-minerals corridors that connect Canadian mines and refineries to U.S. battery, defence and nuclear facilities as part of a single “hemispheric security” narrative.
What to do now
If you’re a Canadian miner, processor, or an industry association, this is not something to file and forget. It is the first chapter of a negotiation that will shape trade flows and investment decisions for the rest of the decade. In the first half of 2026, you will need to explain how your project helps both the Canadian and American governments fix vulnerabilities by reducing import reliance and adding allied processing capacity.
Trump has given his team six months to show progress. Canada should not wait for a surprise Truth Social post announcing new tariffs on foreign-processed minerals. Industry has a short window to help Ottawa frame a proactive offer: Canada as the preferred North American partner for critical mineral processing.
Taken together with the National Security Strategy and the space order, these proclamations are another piece of Trump’s 2026 story and essential considerations for CUSMA negotiations. Canadian mining, processing and tech firms that read this as a negotiation roadmap and get busy in Q1 will have a shot at shaping the rules they could be living under for the next decade.
The team at Texture Communications has deep experience in critical minerals and major projects. Our clients become industry-moving thought leaders through powerful communications, and they get government funding and approvals through our lobbying efforts. Work with us to ensure your story is heard and your most important projects are built.
Interested in reading the full proclamation? You can find it here.
